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The s t a t e  labour control  framework i n  South Africa seems an Orwellian creation: l a w s  
tha t  grant o r  deny residence "rights" i n  the white c i t i e s ,  tha t  confine workers t o  a 
migrant s t a tus  o r  tha t  place workers i n  some intermediate limbo, as " f ron t ie r  
commuters"; l a w s  tha t  bar  women from employment outside impoverished "bantustans"; 
and laws tha t  make i l l e g a l  the  job search of mill ions who have not o f f i c i a l l y  been 
requisi t ioned o r  whose contracts have not been approved by the  s t a te .  
The African worker, pass i n  hand, stands before an elaborate bureaucratic 
apparatus: the loca l  and d i s t r i c t  labour bureaux tha t  sanction urban employment and 
approve requis i t ions  t o  br ing i n  migrant labourers; the various labour o f f i c i a l s  and 
commissioners tha t  authorise employment and a l locate  job requis i t ions  t o  the  scat tered 
African r u r a l  areas; the  d i s t r i c t  and t r i b a l  labour bureaux i n  the  black r u r a l  areas 
tha t  f i l l  "bulk requisi t ions" f o r  labourers and tha t  "legalise" entry  i n t o  the white 
areas. 
Behind every black worker stand the i n s t i t u t i o n s  of enforcement. The pass 
courts and "aid centres" annually jail o r  "endorse out" hundreds of thousands of 
Africans i l l e g a l l y  present i n  the  white areas. I n  advance of these i n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  
the  waves of enforcement o f f i c ia l s :  the South African police who c l e w  the  s t r e e t s  
of i l l e g a l  workers and the homes of i l l e g a l  lodgers; the administration board 
inspectors who search out unregistered workers; and the bantustan secur i ty  o f f i c i a l s  
who police the  black dormitory towns on the black periphery and who police the camps 
f o r  displaced and redundant black labour. 
For most observers of South Africa, the labour control  framework is  what it  
purports t o  be, an e f fec t ive  s t a t e  abrogation of the labour market. The array of laws, 
bureaux, courts and police i s  evidence, i n  i t s e l f ,  of ef fect ive  s t a t e  control. The 
"effect" of the Bantu Labour Act of 1964, one c r i t i c  observes, "is t o  provide the  
Executive with t o t a l  control  over where Africans may work, and what work they may 
do". (1) That emphasis on effect ive  control  recurs throughout the c r i t i c a l  socia l  
commentary on South Africa. Ben Magubane depicts the s t a t e ,  poised behind i t s  labour 
control  console, d i rect ing labour t o  sectors  as required: 
Thus, various s t a t u t e s  regulating African l i f e  i n  the  
urban areas  operate a s  nonmarket techniques f o r  c rea t ing  
a vast  f l o a t i n g  labor pool from which the  government can 
detach individual u n i t s  a s  needed, much as  i n  a slave- 
labor system ... I f  such labor proves not t o  be 
forthcoming, the police simply t ighten the enforcement 
of the  pass system; i f  t h i s  does not work, emergency 
labor f o r  the farms and mines can be met from prison 
ros ters .  (2) 
Stanley Greenberg, in an earlier work, depicts a smoothly functioning and effective 
labour control system. "The Native Laws Amendment Act of l952 developed the 
sometimes haphazard barrier between country and town into a veritable Berlin Wall", 
Greenberg writes. "It provided for a system of labor bureaus that, in the absence of 
market mechanisms, allocated African labor in both urban and rural areas." (3) 
The Nationalist government's own imagery has included a smoothly operating 
labour control system. With the passage of labour bureau legislation in 1952, the 
Department of Native Affairs looked forward to new allocative efficiencies: "It is 
now possible, thanks to the existence of a network of labour bureaux which have 
particulars regarding the demand for and supply of labour at any place in the Union 
readily available, to find immediate employment for workseekers who otherwise 
sometimes had to wander about looking for work for days on end." (4) Dr Eiselen, the 
secretary of the Department, while noting delays in implementation, observed that 
"with the efficient functioning of all sections of the system, there should be little 
difficulty in securing an equitable distribution of all the labour available in the 
,Union .l1 (5) In the texts of "native administrationff courses, the system emerged 
as complete and balanced: "the control of labour is effected in very close 
cooperation with the tribal labour bureaux . . .l1; "the functions of efflux control 
from the homelands and influx control from the administration areas coincide and are 
co-ordinated." (6) 
The labour control system has indeed had a profound impact on the lives of 
black South Africans and the privileged opportunities of white workers, industrialists, 
and farmers. African women have in fact been barred from factory employment in 
certain areas, particularly the Western Cape. (7) Commuter townships in the 
bantustans, such as Mdantsane and KwaMashu, are concrete expressions of state policies 
that have virtually stopped new housing construction for Africans in the white urban 
areas. And there is a bitter reality to the some 600,000 Africans who were forcibly 
removed from white areas during the 1970s and the some 4.5 million influx control 
prosecutions during the same period. (8) 
But the dimensions of the system and its pernicious consequences should not 
detract from an enormously contradictory reality: this is a system that historically 
has repeatedly threatened to break down and that now, with the increasing scale of 
market processes and the increasing scope of control today, tends increasingly toward 
breakdown. 
The labour control framework is incomplete; the laws and regulations are 
unevenly implemented, enforced and effective: the bureaucratic machinery is under- 
staffed and sometimes overrun. The operation of the labour framework has proved 
internally contradictory: that is, its successes - the constraints on labour 
mobility, the bottling up of rural black populations and the stratification of the 
African working class - have only strengthened the forces threatening to undo the 
system of control. As we shall see, state efforts to control the labour market have 
constantly been challenged by black workers, requiring yet more elaborate forms of 
state control - only to set in motion yet more determined efforts by workers to 
circumvent the system. 
At the same time, state officials and politicians have had to struggle with 
the spiralling costs that have accompanied the expanding system of control: the 
simple but real budgetary costs, the greatly expanded coterie of clerks, managers, 
magistrates, inspectors and police; the "market distortions" that favoured some 
sectors and some employers over others and that have set off struggles within the 
white community; the growing entanglement and illegitimacy of state and economy and 
the spectre of growing African disaffection and resistance on a large scale; and, 
finally, and perhaps most important, the evident prospect that new control measures 
will prove insufficient, indeed that they will create new pressures to circumvent the 
state appaxatus, requiring yet more control measures and yet more costs. 
This contradictory r ea l i t y  i s  a t  the centre of our understanding of s t a t e  
and market processes. The South African labour framework has been elaborated, we 
shal l  discover, a s  of f ic ia l s  have t r ied  to  control increasingly unwieldy market and 
class  processes. But the s t a t e  has loomed larger  and larger  i n  the market, not because 
control measures have proved effective but because these measures have continually 
proved inadequate to  the developing forces tending to  circumvent them. The tendency 
toward breakdown has produced, paradoxically, a growing s t a t e  presence, a f'urther 
entangling of po l i t ics  and markets, an elaboration of the rac ia l  s ta te .  (9) 
A t  the same time, the insufficiency of s ta te  capacity and the r i s ing  costs 
of control have produced recurrent and growing pol i t ica l  turmoil within the s tate .  
The elaboration of the s t a t e  i n  t h i s  contradictory context has produced not unity 
but doubts and, increasingly, a struggle over the best means for  preserving 
privilege and maintaining order. Some actors have responded to  the insufficiency of 
repressive and rac is t  methods with demands fo r  more. Others, against the dominant 
presumptions favouring increased control, have given tentative voice to  new policy 
directions: l e s s  evidently coercive ways f o r  allocating labour, new mechanisms t o  
reduce the costs of s t a t e  regulation, and new approaches t o  inducing compliance and 
building broader support fo r  the social order. These struggles have proved endemic 
since the l a t e  1930s and now have become so intense and indeterminate tha t  they 
threaten the coherence of the s t a t e  response. 
THE TENDENCY TOWARD BFEAKDOWN 
A. I l l ega ls ,  Deserters and Workshy 
The tendency toward breakdown i s  given, i n  the f i r s t  instance, i n  the concept of 
control and the vagazies of the human sp i r i t .  Mineowners and farmers, pol i t ic ians and 
s t a t e  f'unctionaries have demanded labour control measures because of an elementary 
reality: African peasants and workers have not chosen to  l i v e  and work where these 
various European actors would choose to  have them spend the i r  time and labour-power. 
Had some natural or  market process produced an acceptable distribution of African 
labourers, these s t a t e  impositions would undoubtedly have proved superfluous and, i n  
time, fa l len  away. 
This tension i s  an in t r in s i c  and ahistoric feature of labour control. The 
labour control officialdom must remain eve?-vigil:mt l e s t  the accumulated w i l l  and 
resistance of thousands of individual workers undo the system of control. 
I n  the f i r s t  quarter of this century, for  example, the Bri t ish administration 
i n  Rhodesia constructed a coercive labour environment - the conventional array of taxes, 
pass laws, and land restr ic t ions - to  f ac i l i t a t e  the recruitment of African labourers. 
Yet the system was ever threatened by individual resistance. The Labour Board of 
Southern Rhodesia, Charles van Onselen writes, was undermined by the "almost 
universal tendency of i ts  workers to  desert". Much l a t e r ,  even a f t e r  the system of 
administration had substantially been refined, African workers moved on to  relat ively 
higher wage areas i n  the South, ultimately the Witwatersrand, "through successive ac ts  
of desertion". (10) On the Witwatersrand, where the system of contracts, passes and 
compounds was be t te r  developed yet,  mineowners complained tha t  African mineworkers 
were overpaid and over-alert to  other opportunities. The General Manager of the Crown 
Reef Gold Mine told the Industrial  Commission of Inquiry at the turn of the century 
that "no fewer than 1,030 ka f f i r s  deserted" the mine i n  the past year, leaving hardly 
a trace, as  they took up other mine contracts o r  rejoined the i r  families i n  the rural 
areas. (11) 
A hal;?--century l a t e r ,  a f t e r  the s t a t e  had turned t o  Draconian measures t o  
gain control of the labour market, individual workers remained res i l ien t ,  seeking to  
maximise the i r  choices as  of f ic ia l s  t r i ed  t o  r e s t r i c t  them. In 1967, an inter- 
departmental committee lamented the continuing presence i n  the white urban areas of an 
"appreciable number of picky and workshy unemployed" - individuals who remained i n  the 
urban areas despite government efforts to sweep out those not there "for the purpose 
of working" and those who refused the available work in favour of some better-paid 
alternative. The committee called for stronger action, as a floating asmy of black 
labour .made a mockery of state intentions: "The success with which many Bantu are 
able to remain and work illegally in prescribed areas for months and even years 
undermines the efficiency of labour bureau and control arrangements and makes it 
imperative that methods be implemented to exercise orderly controls and authority 
over the illegal entry, residence and employment of Bantu in the prescribed areas."(l2) 
As we shall Bee later, the state has shaped the labour market in important 
ways, imposing severe restrictions on mobility and uprooting millions of "redundant" 
workers. Yet control measures, whenever applied, have had to cope with the human 
material that resists state intentions - individuals that risk illegality, that 
abrogate contracts and 6esert their work, that prove work-shy and recalcitrant before 
the constricted opportunities made available to them. 
B. Changing Economy and the "Labour Surplus Problem" 
If the nature of South ~friGags economy remained unchanged in this century, we would 
none the less anticipate growing pressures to circumvent state control measures. In 
simple terms, the scale of this drama has changed: millions more workers have come 
to depend more fully on their participation in the wage economy; thousands more 
employers have turned to an expanding and more diverse labour market; and more 
industrial sectors now compete effectively for access to the African labour market. 
There are, in effect, more encounters between workers and capitalists, more 
transactions and more alternatives. For the state, ensuring a "proper distribution" 
of labour through regulation and coercion is, inevitably,= ever more demanding task. 
But the character of the economy has not remained static, as the scale of 
market transactions has expanded. The developing economy, shaped by the state, has 
fostered growing labour surpluses - large concentrations of landless and destitute 
persons, desperate to find work in the cities. The political economy has created, 
in effect, growing pools of workers with powerful incentives to challenge and 
circumvent the state labour control framework. 
ThefrMarg5nally Superfluous" 'l5) 
Outside virtually all labour bureaux in the urban areas and outside tribal bureaux, 
magistrate's and mine-recruiting offices in the rural areas, stand clusters of idle 
work-seekers. At the Ngwelezana township, near the Richards Bay "growth point", up 
to 350 will wait outside the magistratets office looking for work. Last year, an 
official recalls, "I had a thousand people at my gate every day". Such queues of 
work-seekers have led officials to extreme conclusions. The labour official for the 
Port Natal Administration Board observes, for example, that "at this point in time, 
there is an unlimited supply of labour". TEBA (mine-recruiting) officials in the 
Transkei, KwaZulu and Lebowa report that usually 300 to 500 workers stand at the door- 
step every morning, with perhaps only 50 mine jobs available. ICEBA officials 
everywhere believe that, in the absence of quotas, they could readily double their 
"labour outputn without considerable effort and without labour agents. Some, like 
those in the northern Transvaal, Bophuthatswana, and southern Natal, believe they could 
triple their output. (14) 
For many Africans in the rural areas, there is no labour market. The 
Northern Transvaal Administration Board sends its mobile units into a portion of 
Lebowa but neglects most of it, while by-passing Gazankulu altogether. The board 
officer admits that "parts of Gazankulu are not being tapped". Large portions of the 
African rural areas receive virtually no requsst~ fo.1. employment ("requisitions"). 
At Maluti in the Transkei, the tribal bureau receives no requisitions from Umtata for 
months at a time - the waiting hall, with its rows of benches standing empty and 
silent, the columns for posting job notices unmarred by a single piece of paper. 
Other research has found a similar pattern at Sterkspruit and at tribal bureaux across 
all of the Transkei. (15) At Motetsi in Lebowa, only 25 km from Pietersburg, some 
months pass without a single requisition; other months axe better, perhaps 200 jobs, 
though usually from a few bulk requisitions for construction labourers. An official 
of the Lebowa Department of Interior observes that "very few employers come this time 
of year". 
Across KwaZulu, even in the immediate vicinity of industrial areas, thepe 
are widespread reports of an ever-closing labour market. In recent years, there has 
been virtually no labour recruiting in Umbumbulu south of Durban, Ingwavuma well 
north of Richard's Bay, Ongoye near Ladysmith, Okahlamba neax Escourt, Inkanyesi near 
Eshowe, Mapumulo near Greytown, and Vulmehlo near Umzinto. (16) 
The contraction of the labour market and growth of labour surpluses axe 
evident in TEBAl S abandonment of labour agents and runners. While previously TEBA 
relied upon them to seek out labour in the more remote rural axeas, the ready supply 
of labour in recent years has made such a network super~uous: the demise of the 
agents, a Transvaal official observes, is "one of the penalties of the oversupply of 
labour". Officials of ACRO (the coal-mine recruiting organisation) : stersburg 
used to advertise vacancies, sending African runners on bicycles to , 3e posts. 
Now, people come on their own, without notice, from as far away as Ts The TEBA 
networks h, ~bandoned in KwaZulu and the Transkei. (17) ave alsc been 2 
near Pi( 
adverti t 
zaneen. 
Since mines "open" and flclosell within a matter of days, TEBa offices 
conventionally take whatever labour is available on their "doorsteps". "There are 
sufficient numbers calling at our doors to fill our needs", a Transvaal officer 
observes. "It is very easy to go outside the door and pick up the five that fill the 
bill. The actual recruiting of labour has actually stopped." In Durban, a TEBA 
official states that "they're stacked up at our door". An official in the 
Pietersburg area describes the new mood: 
The TEBA recruiter has an easy time of it these days. 
He must just sit back and wait for them to come in. 
I remember when I had to address meetings, give all 
sorts of parties, drive all over. Those days are in 
the past. 
Under conditions of labour surplus, announcements of work opportunities 
often produce quite startling results. At Maluti in the Transkei, the axrival of an 
ISCOR recruiter in 1982 with a requisition for 300 experienced workers brought out 
over a thousand former ISCOR employees; an open request for 300 workers in 1978 
brought out 4,000 work-seekers. (18) At Motetsi in Lebowa, the labour bureau clerk 
rings a bell to announce the arrival of a new job requisition. When he rings the bell 
on a Monday, two or three hundred people line up. In January, one officer observes, 
"tllere is a hell of a rush . . . if you ring that bell. They come out like moles out 
of their holes11. 
To protect against a rush of desperate job seekers, in Transkei has 
erected security fences around its offices - ''not to guard against terrorism", an 
official notes, "but to keep the workers out, to keep them from tearing the place 
down". In King Williamstown, TEBA, which had for a number of years employed virtually 
no novice miners, received "a pretty considerable order" and announced it: "the 
blacks just flattened the fencef1. 
South Africa's most prominent economists differ on the scale of South 
Africavs labour surplus problem. P J van der Merwe, an established economist and a 
high-level official in various state labour institutions, relies upon 1970 census data 
and unemployment increases in subsequent years to arrive at what he himself considers 
a "minimumlI estimate. Unemployment on white farms and in urban areas, he calculates, 
grew from 252,000 in 1969 to 528,000 in 1976, from 6.1 to 10.9 per cent of the labour 
force (though no doubt higher for the African labour force). (19) Unemployment and 
underemployment in the bantustans rose precipitously during the early 1970s, from 
32,000 in 1970 to 396,000 in 1976. Van der MerweQs estimates suggest that well over 
half of the new African entrants to the labour market in the early 1970s could not be 
accommodated in employment. (20) The problem was no doubt compounded during the 
post-1976 recessionary period. By 1979, African unemployment in the metropolitan 
areas, according to one conservative estimate, rose to 16 percent, and in the "self- 
governing Black states" to 20 percent. (21) 
Other observers have supplemented census figures with employment surveys 
and estimates of underemployment in the bantustans (based upon the numbers of workers 
who could be productively employed there). (22) These calculations, like van der 
Meme's, suggest a rising tide of unemployment in the 1970s but, by contrast, place 
current unemployment levels at stwgering heights and well above the census estimates. 
,Lieb J Loots suggests tentatively that unemployment may have doubled between 1970 and 
1977, with the urban figures rising from 9.5 to 23.1 percent. (23) Charles Simkins, 
incorporating measures of agricultural underemployment, places overall unemployment 
at 22.4 percent in 1977 - 2.3 million people, almost all of whom were black. Simkins, 
like Loots and van der Merwe, believes unemployment rose steadily throughout the 
1970s. (24) 
These quantitative S-tudies and the personal impressions related earlier are 
apparently just snapshots of a gathering labour surplus problem. The numbers of 
unempl.oyed likely doubled during the 1960s, a period of rapid economic growth, 
increased at a yet greater rate during the 1970s when the pace of economic growth was 
a respectable 3 percent, and seem almost certain to expand, perhaps even phenomenally, 
during the coming decades. (25) The Prime Minister's economic advisers project that, 
with an annual growth rate of 3.6 percent (the actual figure for 1970-77), 
unemployment would increase from 10.6 to 21.9 percent in 1987, from 903,000 to 
2,406,000 persons. The African unemployment rate, even b these conservative 
government estimates, would likely exceed 26 percent. (267 
Labour S m l u s  as Structured Reality 
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are the product of three developments in South Africa's 
politic omy. F: le bantustans, bereft of productive capacity, no longer 
support tne subsistence OS their inhabitants,who have turned increasingly to the wage 
economy for survival. Second, the increasing mechanisation of agriculture and the 
state-assisted consolidation of white faxms have displaced large numbers of African 
labourers and tenants, with the great bulk forced back to the over-populated 
bantustans and overcrowded labour market. And,third, the growing capital intensity 
and rationdisation of manufackure in the urban areas has brought a declining growth 
in the demand for African labour. This triple combination - growing wage dependence, 
displacement from white agriculture and declining labour demand in white manufacture - 
has created growing pools of marginal African workers desperate for work and 
contemptuous of state obstacles to mobility. 
There is widespread and corroborating evidence suggesting that the bantustans 
are now essentially repositories for African populations, surplus and otherwise, and 
not vehicles for productive agriculture. Simkins estimates that since 1918 the African 
reserves have never supported more than a third of their inhabitants, and by 1960 they 
were supporting fewer than 20 percent. Since then, the dependence on the wage economy 
has grown more stark, with the percentage of bantustan income derived from remittances 
and wages of migrants and commuters rising from 55 percent to 72 percent in 1976, with 
a corresponding drop in the percentage of income received from agriculture. (27) 
Research i n  the Western Cape discovered that  40 percent of African migrant 
workers had no access t o  cul t ivat tble  land and 50 percent owned no c a t t l e  i n  the 
bantustans; three-quarters of migrant families received l e s s  than R24 per month i n  
1976 from agricultural work. (28) In  KwaZulu, earnings from labour exports increased 
from 54.3 percent of bantustan GNP i n  1960, to  70.4 percent i n  1970, to  77.8 percent 
i n  1976. By 1976, three-quarters of the income of Africans l iv ing  i n  KwaZulu derived 
from remitted income of family members a t  work i n  the wage economy outside 
KwaZulu. (29) 
The decline of subsistence production i n  the bantustans and the growing. 
dependence on the wage economy are evident i n  the first-hand impressions of labour 
control and recruiting off ic ials .  I n  Maluti (~ ranske i )  , one off icer  observes, "only 
the old people, the children and the useless st i l l  stay on farms". I n  l i gh t  of mine 
off ic ials '  experiences with r a in fa l l  and drought conditions and labour recruiting, 
the observation seems increasingly plausible. I n  the past, when Africans s t i l l  
depended on income and food from the i r  own plots,  bad rains  brought increased 
in te res t  i n  wage work on the mines. But i n  1982 the widespread drought brought 
almost no increase i n  the labour available to  the mines. "With the population 
explosion , vir tual ly  all the African labour has been forced in to  the labour market", 
a TEBA off ic ia l  observes. "That chap has got to  work: before, he might have had a 
piece of land,a few ca t t le ,  but now he has no choice but work." In KwaZulu, a TEBA 
of f ic ia l  remarks, "the question of seasonal rains and droughts has much l e s s  effect 
than it did 10 years ago". The TEBA off icer  for  the Matatiele d i s t r i c t  also confirms 
the pattern: the rains  no longer have an impact on labour supplies i n  the Transkei. 
The massive retrenchment of African labour i n  the white farming areas has 
contributed further to  the massive crowding i n  the bantustans and at the margins of 
the labour market. The numbers of Africans employed on white farms had increased i n  
t h i s  century un t i l  the l a t e  s ix t ies ,  when employment levelled off a t  678,500 regular 
and 169,500 casual labourers; by the l a t e  seventies the numbers had begun dropping, 
to  565,000 regular and 112,000 casual workers in- 1979. (30) 
The reduction of the African labour force i n  white agriculture has been 
accompanied by the accelerated and forced removal of African tenants and squatters 
and the elimination of "black spots" i n  the white rural  areas. Between 1960 and 1982, 
i n  the Transvaal alone, 400,000 Africans were evicted from fasms and 400,000 relocated 
i n  the course of "consolidation" and "black spot" removals; 74,276 were relocated i n  
1980 alone. (31) This "modernisation" process i n  white agriculture has forcibly 
displaced millions of Africans nationally, to  u t t e r ly  impoverished "closer 
settlements" i n  the bantustans, t o  Kwaggafontein i n  an imaginary Ndebele "state", to 
a Winterveld i n  an "independent" Bophuthatswana. 
Compounding this marginality i s  the declining labour absorptive capacity of 
manufacture and the growing select ivi ty  of the legal labour market. While 
manufacturing employment grew by 5 percent a year between 1958 and 1967, i t  dropped 
to 3.3 percent between 1968 and 1977. The Economic Development Programme projects 
only 2.3 percent annual employment growth r a t e  fo r  manufacturing between 1978 and 1987, 
below the projected 2.6 percent annual increase' i n  the labour force. (32) 
The declining labour-absorptive capacity of industry is  apparently related 
to the rapid "capital  deepening" of the economy, especially evident during the 1970s. 
The Economic Development Programme reports that  "the average capi tal  stock per 
employee i n  the economy increased 2.4 percent per annum over the period from 1960 t o  
1969, and by no l e s s  than 4.3 percent per annum from 1970 t o  1977". (33) The average 
capital-output r a t i o  also grew between mid-1971 and mid-1977, from 2.17 to  2.67. (34) 
"Except i n  a few sectors, where there were special circumstances", the Economic 
Development Programme reports, "the South African economy therefore experienced an 
accelerated trend towards greater capi tal  deepening during the seventies. This trend 
was present i n  enterprises i n  both the private and the public sectors". (35) 
In the black rural areas, where surplus labour conditions have grown 
increasingly acute, this tripartite "modernisation" process has been accompanied by 
the withering of the legal labour market. Large portions of the bantustans, we 
discussed earlier, have simply been left out of the institutional labour market, as 
there is no legal recruiting or requisitioning of labour. But, even where there is 
a formal labour market, job prospects in the "modern economy" have grown steadily 
bleaker: the manufacturing sector for the most part has stopped requisitioning 
labour from the rural areas; the mining sector, in an attempt to ratiodise its 
labour situation, has concentrated on the re-engagement of experienced mine-workers 
at the expense of the unskilled novice miners. 
The use of "valid re-engagement guarantees" (VRGS) has become so widespread 
that traditional mine recruiting areas are frequently "closed" to new applicants. In 
the northern Transvaal and KwaZulu, including Maputoland, there is some recruitment 
of novice miners: 27 percent of those engaged in 1981 in KwaZulu were novices. (1n 
1980, 42 percent were novices.) But in the Transkei, TEBA officials indicate that 
novice recruitment from January to October never rises above 10 percent. As a 
consequence, the "mines are virtually closed until October. The orders are very 
sparse. Only a VRG can be offered work." In Lesotho, the percentage of re-engaged 
experienced miners rose from 30 percent in 1976 to 60 percent in 1979; in the 
Transkei, the percentage of VRGs was already high in 1974, around 80 percent, but 
rose to nearly 90 percent by 1978. (36) 
The manufacturing sector now shows little interest in the bantustans as a 
source of labour. The requisitioning of labour in the African rural areas is 
confined to unskilled jobs (temporary labourers, ni ht watchmen, and night-soil 
removers), the "dirty" work (the foundries at ISCOR?, "unpopular" firms. A labour 
official in Lebowa observes: "Most requisitions that come here people know are not 
good." In the Transkei, the recruiting of migrant workers for manufacturing has 
remained static since 1974, with virtually no increase since 1970. (37) 
O n l y  the state sector itself seems to value continued access to this 
impoverished labour pool. Requisitions for the most part originate with civil 
engineering firms constructing large state-supported projects; also, with the 
municipalities, the state railways and pazastatals. ISCOR plants at Newcastle, van 
der Bijl Pmk and Pretoria were the most frequent recruiters of labour at Maluti 
(~ranskei) ,Nongoma (~wa~ulu) , Modjadji (~ebowa) and in the eastern Transvaal. The 
South African Railways recruited large numbers of workers at Matatiele in the 
Transkei, and Modjadji in Lebowa. The municipalities, particularly Johannesburg and 
Pretoria, recruit generally in the Northern Transvaal and in the Mount Frere area 
(~ranskei) for rubbish removal workers. 
Finally, the legal labour market, already contracted geographically and 
sectorally, has been narrowed further by gender segmentations and exclusions. Because 
of government regulations, the requisitioning of labour for urban areas has been 
confined almost exclusively to men. The magistrate at Malumulele (~azankulu) can 
recall no requisitions for women; the Interior Department official in Lebowa notes 
that "99.99 percent of requisitions are for men". The Port Natal Administration Board 
requisitions women only for nursing jobs and for domestic service but "only after 
local labour is exhausted and only in the immediate areas of KwaZulu". As a result, 
women seek employment in the least remunerative and stable areas - casual and daily 
faxm work nearly everywhere, the sawmills in Lebowa, the roadworks in Maputoland and 
Vanda, the very small firms in Gazankulu, and seasonally on the sugar estates in Natal. 
C. Creating Incentives to "Shoot Strai~ht" 
The powing marginalisation of the African population and its isolation in the 
bantustans are compelling incentives to "shoot straightn; that is, to circumvent the 
system of labour regulation and go directly to Johannesburg, Durban or Cape Town. 
These developing incentives are inherent in the stark contrast between rural 
impoverishment and urban opportunities and in the high cost of remaining in this 
rural hell. The system of labour control, by d d n g  up the African labour surplus, 
only magnifies the inducements for millions of Africans to become Ifillegals" in the 
dark recesses of the urban labour market. 
The operation of the economy and labour control framework has created two 
crude strata of Africans - those with legal access to the urban labour market and 
urban residence rights, and those who stand outside with only qualified access to . 
employment and urban areas. The former hold a "privileged" position in the labour 
market and, indeed, receive considerably higher wages than other Africans. The 
latter face stagnating or declining living standards, as the growing labour surplus 
conditions, the contraction of the labour market and the operation of influx control 
have all tended to suppress wages. In the period since 1970, African wages in the, 
urban industrial sectors have increased fourfold, while rural incomes, excepting 
urban remittances, have stagnated. By the mid-1970s, the ratio of African urban to 
rural income - 8.3 to 1 among wage earners - was beginning to take on the appearance 
of European-African inequalities. (38) 
That gap, in part the creation of the state, is a powerful inducement to 
overrun state controls. In 1960, before the surplus conditions and urban-rural 
inequalities were so glaring, the manager for non-European Affairs in Johannesburg 
observed that "native families" constitute a "favoured class who enjoy a standard of 
living superior to that enjoyed by their compatriots outside the cityf'. Consequently, 
Johannesburg serves as "the Mecca of every workseeker in the country and this is 
doubtless too the reason why these men will resort to literally any means of gaining 
entry into the town . . ," . (39) 
Today, the widening gap invites Africans to bypass their tribal labour 
bureaux and go directly to the urban areas without the proper authorisation and 
passes. "Most of those who don' t get jobsff at TEBA or the labour bureau, a mine 
representative comments, "make their way South. They are not prepared to wait." 
The conditions in the bantustans have become so desperate that it is 
difficult to imagine the level of repression that would be sufficient to forestall the 
pursuit of market alternatives. By one estimate, an African from Lebowa can take up 
work illegally in Johannesburg, spend three months out of the year in jail, and still 
improve his or her personal income by 255 percent; even if an individual rots in jail 
for nine months and works for only thee, his or her income would still exceed by 85 
percent his or her likely income trying to remain and work in Lebowa. (40) 
The maintenance and elaboration of influx controls have operated to create 
labour surpluses and displace them to the rural bantustans. The massive state 
repression in the 1960s and 1970s, discussed in the next section, has held 
urbanisation constant over two decades, 1.960 to 1980, despite quite a considerable 
advance of productive forces. Under normal circwnstances, Simkins estimates, the 
percentage of the South African population urbanised would have increased from 49.6 
percent in 1960 to 55.3 percent in 1970, to 56.7 percent in 1980, leaving South Africa 
underurbanised by 9.4 percent, or, more dramatically, 2.7 million people. (41) 
But the displacement of the "marginally superfluous", the apparent goal of 
the state officialdom, only underlines the contradictions in state apartheid policies. 
The displacement of labour surpluses and the exacerbation of urban-rural inequalities 
is, simultaneously, an inducement to urban migration. As Simkins observes, at constant 
levels of state regulation there is a tendency for the unemployed and the poorer to 
seek out higher-employment and higher-income areas. Increased state enforcement to 
forestall that migration exacerbates urban-rural inequalities and enhances the 
attractiveness of migration to the cities. It requires, if the influx is to be 
slowed, yet further state intervention in the market. (42) 
D. Withering Constituencies for Control 
There are some enormous ironies in this process: control has made necessary more 
controls; the successful damming up of labour in the African rural areas has created 
inducements to burst the dams. Perhaps the most striking irony, however, is contained 
in the politics of labour control. As the costs of maintaining control have risen, as 
the system has become more unwieldy and contradictory, and as Africans have mobilised 
against it, the constituencies for control have withered. The organised class actors 
who in the past championed labour controls have pulled back, leaving the state 
officialdom exposed without concrete support in civil society. 
Commercial faslners making the transition to capitalist agciculture prodded 
the state throughout this century to impose more effective controls on the movements 
of African labour. The South African Agricultural Union (sAAu) pressed for the 
removal of squatters and the intensification and, later, the elimination of labour 
.tenancy, for the development of an effective pass system and the enforcement of 
labour contracts. On the eve of the NationaJ. Party ascendancy after World War 11, the 
SAAU demanded the expulsion of "redundant" Africans from the urban locations, central 
prison camps for fasm labour, severe controls over the movements of African children 
on white farms, and, most important, the legal division of the African population into 
rural and urban sections. (43) 
The SAAU continued to demand effective implementation of labour control 
measures until the early 19708, when fasm labour requirements began to change and the 
need for control measures lessened. The SAAU was more interested in land 
consolidation and the forced displacement of Africans to the bantustans. When the 
Riekert Commission took evidence in the late 1970s, the S W  expressed only 
perfunctory support for the labour bureaux, the principal administrative mechanism of 
labour control: 'Ithe system is of little value to agriculture as it is administered 
at present". The SAAU was more concerned, not surprisingly, with the displacement of 
squatters, sharecroppers, tenants and independent African farmers and the "maxirmun 
consolidation" of black and white areas. (44) 
The Chamber of Mines, too, played a central political role helping fashion 
South Africaqs labour control framework. Throughout this century, it insisted that 
the state help construct, maintain and police a cheap labour system for the mines. 
On the one hand, the Chamber urged the state to preserve viable "native reserves" as 
a necessary backdrop to oscillating labour migration; on the other hand, it was a 
pre-eminent supporter of the pass laws, influx control, contract and compound labour 
and criminal penalties for breach of contract. 
Yet, today, the mines are attempting to rationalise their labour situation, 
selectively stabilising in areas proximate to townships, such as in Kimberley, and 
systematically seeking the re-engagement of experienced miners. With staggering 
overcrowding, destitution and labour over-supply in the bantustans, the Chamber has 
been able to dismantle TEJ3A1s traditional system of depots, labour agents and runners. 
The Chamber has also been able to abandon its traditional defence of the 
labour control framework. TEJ3A officials now emphasise the role of markets and the 
organisation's attention to service, testing and communication. "The mipatory labour 
system is a bad system any place in the world", a TE3A official concludes. "But in a 
necessazy environment, we do a wonderful job. We keep a good contact system with the 
man at work and his people at home." TEBA officials now see themselves as 
"progressive" competitors for labour in a market environment. The old days, with the 
"big buana types, sitting back in their offices", are gone. 
When black opposition to apartheid, and the pass system in particular, 
erupted in violence, boycotts and state repression in 1960, businessmen from all 
sectors raised questions about the viability of the labour control framework. Five 
organisations, led by the Association of Chambers of Commerce and including the 
Federated Chamber of Industries, besought the government to reconsider the "undue 
restriction of freedom of movement of the Bantu" and to decriminalise the pass system. 
When violence and black protests became endemic after the 1973 general strikes and 
1976 civil disorders, businessmen again urged "reform" of the labour control 
framework, with an emphasis on opening up urban residence rights and creating 
opportunities for a "black middle class". (45) 
In 1982, the government, after long internal consideration of the Riekert 
Commission recommendations on labour regulation, introduced new labour legislation - 
the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill - that would further have 
tightened controls over the influx of African workers. Major business organisations 
in manufacture, however, publicly attacked the bill: "From [our organisationts] 
analysis it will be seen that there are serious anomalies and shortcomings in the 
draft Bill and at the outset [this organisationl must EXPRESS DEEP CONCE3RN over the 
apparent disregard for the views and feelings of the Black community evident in the 
draft legislation. (46) 
The irony is now complete. State officials, it seems, must now face the 
growing contradictions in labour control, but without the direct support and guidance 
of labour control's traditional proponents. The mining houses, capitalist farmers, 
and manufacturers have put distance between themselves and the state labour framework, 
as labour requirements have changed and as the state role in the maxket has become 
more problematic. There is, consequently, no longer the self-evident direction and 
I sense of purpose that follows from a coherent political base. The growing chaos in 
l the maxket has been paralleled by a growing incoherence within the state. 
l 
This paper is part of a chapter on the "State kainst the Narket" in Stanlev B 
~reenberg's ~egitimating the Illegitimate. state, markets and resistance South 
Africa (Berkeley, 1987). 
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